The present set of arrangements for U.S. exchange market intervention policy was largely developed after 1961 during the Bretton Woods era. However, that set had important historical precedents. In this paper we examine precedents to current arrangements, focusing on three historical eras: pre-1934 operations; the Exchange Stabilization Fund operations beginning in 1934; and the Bretton Woods era. We describe operations by the Second Bank of the United States in the pre-Civil War period and then operations by the U.S. Treasury in the post-Civil War period. 
Introduction
The present set of arrangements for U.S. exchange market intervention policy was largely developed after 1961 during the Bretton Woods era. However that set had important historical precedents.
In this paper we examine the precedents to current arrangements focusing on three historical eras: pre The exchange market policies followed before 1934 were not quite the same as modern exchange market intervention, but we believe that an understanding of the historical evolution of current arrangements can yield important insights for modern practices.
Modern exchange market intervention involves operations to influence the exchange rate independent of the other instruments of monetary policy. This has been interpreted during some episodes as pertaining to the level of the exchange rates and in other episodes to its volatility. The techniques used include direct purchases and sales of foreign currencies (both spot and forward) as well as swaps (a simultaneous spot and forward transaction). In addition, most interventions today are sterilized The primary objective of exchange market policy then was to preserve adherence to the gold standard (i.e., to maintain the fixed gold parity by influencing gold flows.) Three principal approaches were used: policies to influence the position of the gold export and import points, such as restrictions on the location of offices where, and when, domestic fiduciary currency could be exchanged for gold; monetary policy actions (changes in discount rates and open market operations) targeted to influence the market exchange rate by altering interest rates so as to affect expenditure or to influence capital movement; direct antecedents to modern exchange market operations such as the purchase and sale of foreign exchange.
Before the Civil War
The U.S. in the first half of the nineteenth century could be characterized as a small open economy on a fixed exchange rate, the international specie standard. Most of its international trade was with England and involved staple exports of cotton and tobacco from the South and imports by the North of manufactured goods and commodities. Although the U.S. monetary standard was bimetallic, international transactions were undertaken largely in gold, which sold at a premium. Most payments were settled in the form of sterling bills drawn by merchant banks and other financial institutions in England.
The first use of official exchange market policy may have been carried out by the Second Bank of the United States, established in 1816, under its President Nicholas Biddle. The Bank began operations in foreign exchange in 1825. The original purpose for these operations was to offset seasonal fluctuations in the prices of sterling bills and to arbitrage bills of exchange rates between regions. Because of its size, extensive branch networks and its connection and line of credit of 250 million with Barings, the leading British merchant bank, the Second Bank quickly dominated the market for sterling bills.
Fritz Redlich (1951) , a leading authority, claimed that Biddle engaged in deliberate exchange market intervention action: "Biddle entered the field of foreign exchange in order to protect the currency from foreign influences and to counteract possible disturbances of business" (p. 131). The same claim is made by Smith (1953) , Hammond (1955) , Myers (1970, p.88) and most recently by Officer (1992) , who states, "Biddle was concerned whenever the exchange rate went beyond the gold-point spread…In such circumstances he would take steps to return the exchange rate to within the spread either through direct exchange transactions or through GTF/GPA (gold-effected transfer of funds/gold point arbitrage)" (p.204), Yet we could find no actual empirical evidence of such operations.
2 However, Smith' s (1953, Chart V) , shows an inverse relationship between the sterling exchange rate (60-day bills on London) and the foreign position of the Second Bank. According to Smith, "Up to 1836, the Bank built up its foreign balances in the periods when foreign exchange rates were low and went into debt when the rates were high, a process not only stabilizing in its effects, but profitable to the banks" (Smith 1953, p.46) , thereby stabilizing the exchange rate.
The Post-Civil War Period
In the post-Civil War period, in two episodes, the U.S. Treasury was involved in exchange market operations. The first was a rescue operation of the U.S. Treasury arranged by a private consortium headed by J.P. Morgan and August Belmont in 1895, at the apex of the struggle over free silver. A U.S. budget deficit after 1890 and the issue of legal tender Treasury Notes of 1890, redeemable in coin, that the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 mandated, created uncertainty about the convertibility of the U.S. dollar, despite the repeal of the Sherman Act in 1893. To finance the deficit, the Treasury ran down its stock of gold and legal tenders. In January 1895, a run on gold in exchange for legal tenders reduced the reserve to $45 million.
In February, the Treasury secretary contracted with the Belmont-Morgan banking syndicate, to market a 4% bond issue, and provide the Treasury with a 6-month short-term interest-free gold credit line to restore the gold reserve. One half of the 3.5 million ounces of gold delivered was to be shipped from Europe at a rate not exceeding 300,000 ounces a month. The syndicate agreed to protect the Treasury against gold withdrawals paid out to redeem legal tenders or sold to obtain exchange. It delivered an additional $25 million in gold in exchange for legal tenders, and borrowed exchange in London to sell in New York, effectively controlling the exchange market. The syndicate marketed the bonds for a total of $68.8 million. During the five months after the contract was signed, no gold was withdrawn from the Treasury.
The second episode was an attempt in March 1906 by Treasury Secretary Shaw to raise the gold import point. To reduce pressure on the New York commercial banks, Secretary Shaw reduced the interest cost on gold imports and thereby lowered the gold import point by a few cents. According to Beckhart et al. (1932 vol. IV) , he "allowed the New York banks to count gold in transit as part of their reserves". As we will consider below, Shaw was following the type of gold policies which had already been perfected by the Bank of England and other European central banks. Although there had been pressure on the Treasury to support sterling exchange in New York on earlier occasions (Beckhart et al. 1932, vol. IV, p.190) , such as during the panic of 1873, these seem to be the only episodes when such operations were actually conducted.
World War I and the Establishment of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, and the system began operations in 1914. The
Federal Reserve Board was given the power "to permit the acceptance of drafts drawn to create dollar exchange, to pass upon applications for and to regulate foreign trade banks and foreign branches of member banks and to regulate direct dealings by the Federal Reserve banks in gold, cable transfers and bills of exchange" (Beckhart et al. 1932, vol. IV, p.216) .
With U.S. entry into World War I in April 1917, the monetary authorities began active involvement in stabilizing exchange rates. Credits were given to the allies to help peg their currencies, and arrangements were made so that the allies could pay for exports directly (Beckhart et al.1932, vol. IV, p.238 (Beckhart et al. 1932, p.243) .
In September 1918, to address the continuing discount on the dollar in neutral countries, the Secretary of the Treasury negotiated special credit arrangements to obtain a supply of foreign exchange from these countries. Finally, in September 1918, the Treasury was given the power to cooperate with other countries to stabilize their currencies (Beckhart et al. 1932, p.248) .
The panoply of controls over the foreign exchange markets and stabilization credits to the Allies, which were terminated between December 1918 and May 1920, established the machinery for future exchange market operations by the U.S. monetary authorities.
U.S. Exchange Market Policies 1919-1931
After gold purchases from London to New York. Third, the Reichsbank also reduced its discount rate (Chandler 1958 , pp.275-277, Clarke 1967 . These policy moves were successful in easing the U.S. recession and temporarily taking pressure off sterling.
In 1928 -29, the strains in the international monetary system continued to build up. In response to the Wall Street stock market boom the Federal Reserve began tightening monetary policy, conducting open market sales and raising the discount rate from 3 ½ to 4 ½ %, attracting capital flows from Europe.
Additional strain on sterling came from the Banque de France which, after the de jure stabilization of the franc on June 25, 1928, began a policy of absorbing gold inflows and converting its foreign exchange reserves into gold (Clarke 1967 
European Precedents: The Classical Gold Standard 1870-1914
Many of the techniques later used by the Federal Reserve were first developed by the Europeans.
Gold Policy
The Bank of England and the other principal central banks engaged in 'gold policy' or used 'gold devices' to alter the gold export and import points. These policies complemented discount rate policy and sometimes served as a substitute. The policies followed by virtually all central banks included altering the prices for gold bars or foreign gold coin; granting interest free advances to gold importers during periods of gold transit; only redeeming notes at head office; and placing physical impediments to the export of gold (Bloomfield 1959 , 1963 , Sayers 1936 ).
Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
The Bank of England never used official purchases and sales of foreign exchange as a policy to keep the exchange rate within the gold points because it did not hold reserves other than gold. The
Banque de France and the Reichsbank rarely used such operations. However, Bloomfield (1963) describes how other European central banks which held reserves in both gold and foreign exchange (sterling, francs and reichsmarks) as well as the monetary authorities of the colonies operating on a gold exchange standard did engage in such policies. According to Bloomfield (1963, p.21) , many European central banks including those of Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland and Russia engaged in exchange market intervention to smooth seasonal and erratic fluctuations in the exchange rate as well as to arrest movements to the gold export point.
Two countries that extensively relied on exchange market intervention before 1914 were Finland and Austria-Hungary. In the case of Finland, after it adopted the gold standard in 1877, "the exchange rate was kept within the gold points exclusively by purchases and sales of foreign exchange by the Bank of Finland." (Bloomfield 1963, p.23 ).
The Austro-Hungarian Bank from 1896 to 1914, after the empire adopted a gold currency in 1897 3
, was able to maintain parity between the crown and gold by its foreign exchange policy. Bloomfield (1963, p.24) describes how the Bank would sell foreign exchange just before the theoretical gold export point was reached and buy foreign exchange just before reaching the gold import point. The
Austro-Hungarian Bank was also an early pioneer in the use of official operations in the forward market.
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Thus exchange rate policy, both gold policy and exchange market interventions were well developed before 1914 in Europe. These policies were further developed in the interwar gold exchange standard.
Exchange Market Operations 1926 -31.
The European central banks and especially the Bank of England engaged in extensive exchange market operations once the gold standard was fully restored in 1926. The Bank of England engaged in gold policies similar to those before 1914 and it also operated directly on the exchange rate. knew it held hidden reserves as large as its published reserves, it would have great difficulty in pursuing its deflationary policies. 7 The Bank also automatically sterilized its operations by compensating security purchases or sales. According to Moggridge (1972, p.185) , this policy of automatic complete offsetting represented an innovation.
The most active period of intervention occurred from September 1926 to September 1929, when, to prevent gold exports, the Bank sold dollars in the open market spot for 10 months during which the sterling dollar rate was below the average gold export point (Moggridge 1972, p.185) . It also, on occasion (March 1928 and in 1930) , sold foreign exchange to reduce funds in the domestic market (a form of monetary policy) (Moggridge 1972, p.186) , and it used its foreign exchange holdings to shift asset conversions to other central banks (Moggridge 1972, p.188) .
As discussed in section 2.4 above, the Bank of England in its perennial defense of sterling was also aided by the New York Fed, Finally, the Bank engaged in massive interventions in the 1931 sterling crisis. Between July and September, the Bank sold $381 million dollars spot and $125 million forward as well as 53 million in francs; 83% of its reserve losses resulted from both operations (Moggridge 1972) .
Despite the disaster at the end, the Bank's exchange market policies enabled it to raise its gold reserves in the majority of quarters from 1926 to 1931. The reserve accumulation also allowed the Bank to follow an easier policy than otherwise, to violate the gold points on numerous occasions and to insulate the British economy from external shocks (Moggridge 1972, pp.196-97) . A key problem with its successful secret intervention is that the Bank's international reserves did not signal the good state of the British economy. This in turn prevented the normal price-specie flow adjustment mechanism of the gold standard from working, thus creating the conditions for a later adjustment following a crisis.
Antecedents and Precedents: The Lessons
In 1934 The gold purchase program went forward in September 1933, when the Treasury agreed to buy gold at an official gold price to be fixed daily. The period of a variable price of gold came to an end on 31
January 1934, when the President under the authority of the Gold Reserve Act, passed the day before, 8 We rely on three unpublished sources for the details of intervention: (1) To make depreciation of the dollar that devaluation had achieved effective, FDR concluded required establishment of a fund comparable to the one the British had.
Section 10 of the Act, provided that $2 billion of the $2.8 billion devaluation profit be deposited with the Treasurer of the United States in a stabilization fund under the exclusive control of the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, whose decisions shall be final and not subject to review by any other officer of the United States. The fund was authorized to deal in gold and foreign exchange and such other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar.
On 27 April 1934 the ESF was formally set up. The ESF first intervened in the foreign exchange market on 5 September, 1934. We know from the Treasury's announcement on 31 January 1934 that it would sell gold to foreign central banks whenever U.S. exchange rates with gold standard currencies reached the gold export point, that the Treasury was familiar with a crucial feature of the gold standard, as it existed either before sterling began to float against the dollar and other currencies in September 1931, or after the dollar was devalued-the gold export and import points that defined the range within which fixed exchange rates could fluctuate. It was the responsibility of a monetary authority in a gold standard regime to keep the level of exchange rates of their national currency within boundaries set by the fixed gold import and the fixed gold export points.
In 1934 the only currencies with such fixed points were the French franc, the currencies of the gold bloc countries -the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland -and the U.S. dollar. Sterling, by contrast, had no mint parity from which to calculate import and export points. Transactions in both gold and foreign exchange kept a currency that was on the gold standard and one that floated within a given range.
A floating currency's value oscillated between a high and a low value. Intervening within gold points or between high and low values of a floating currency used the same techniques. At the gold export point and at the peak floating rate value, the monetary authority bought gold to counter appreciation. At the gold import point and the low floating rate value, it sold gold, which it might have held as reserves, or borrowed. In addition to gold operations, another channel that was used to reduce fluctuations in the exchange value of a currency was the purchase and sale of that currency to bolster it or to rein in its value.
We now turn to some details of Treasury intervention, first in support of the French franc, then in a more adversarial role with respect to floating sterling. We cover the pre-Tripartite period and then the different arrangements that followed. 
Dollar-Franc Rate Intervention Before the Tripartite Agreement
In the second half of 1933, recovery was under way in the world economy, but France began to experience a deepening depression. Earlier it had been insulated against the worldwide economic decline by its massive gold reserves. Over the period 1933 to 1936 France experienced mounting reserve losses in the face of an increasingly overvalued franc. Ongoing political instability reflected the inability to deal with the deflationary pressure. In these years the ESF was involved in numerous operations to buoy up the franc. Intervention is depicted by franc purchases (dark gray bars) and sales (light gray bars) at monthly dates.
Since gold transactions were important episodes of the intervention history, the figure gives only a partial account. Figure 3 gives some information on gold prices, net imports of gold to the U.S. and the increase in gold earmarked in Federal Reserve Banks on foreign account. The data do not identify the foreign owners of the earmarked gold. 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Cents/franc Sources: Board of Governors (1943 , p. 670), Brown (1942 .
Sale Purchase Tripartite Agreement
The first large-scale intervention by the ESF in the franc was on 5 September triggered by the strength of the franc relative to the dollar and sterling from mid-August on. Gold from the London market moved to Paris, not New York. The market believed that a further devaluation of the dollar was likely, or a substantial U.S. inflation, and that sterling depreciation would accompany the dollar's movement.
Speculators sold dollars. From 5 to 25 September it sold spot francs at a price above the dollar-franc parity but below the gold export point to Paris. The dollar strengthened in Paris during 22-28 September, and the ESF was able to buy spot francs at a profitable rate to cover its forward position. Brown (1942, p.50 ) credits the ESF with imposing a check on an outward movement of gold to Paris due to purely temporary causes, thus contributing to the stability of the dollar-franc rate. Shipments of gold in both directions were avoided and as a by-product the ESF had a profit of $335 thousand.
A second example of intervention followed the French franc's weakness in May 1935 produced by political agitation for its devaluation, unsolved budget difficulties, and loss of gold by the Banque de May, when it raised the discount rate to 6 per cent. The ESF again came to the rescue. The FRBNY on 27
May offered to buy $25 million in gold on 28 May on the same terms as earlier.
The renewal of the French financial crisis in June 1936 was marked by a drain of gold from the Banque de France to the U.S. Gold losses persisted through September. Popular discontent with deflation mounted, France finally had to confront the prospect of devaluation, which it had firmly rejected in the years since the franc's parity was established in 1928. It had come to believe that it was not the franc that was out of line but the dollar and sterling that were out of line with the franc. The reality could no longer be denied.
The chronic French financial problem was temporarily solved by the Tripartite Agreement, adopted on 25 September by the U.S., Britain and France to allow the French to devalue the franc with no retaliation by the others. On 26 September the government agreed to back suspension of the gold standard by the Banque de France.
Dollar-Sterling Rate Intervention Before the Tripartite Agreement
Britain's economic situation at the time the ESF began to intervene in sterling can be briefly described. By abandoning the gold standard in September 1931, it gained the flexibility to lower interest rates (because of fears of inflation, after a delay) in June 1932, expand high-powered money, and yet augment its reserves, with the result that its exports grew, unemployment declined, and national income rose in each year from 1933 to the outbreak of the war. 1943, pp. 537-538) , Brown (1942) , and Montagu (1934 Montagu ( -1939 .
High Average Low

Change in Imports Change in Earmarks
Dollars
Millions of Dollars
Tripartite Agreement value sets in as the threat of war grows. ESF purchases of sterling are depicted by dark gray bars, sales by light gray bars at monthly dates. Gold transactions, an important part of ESF intervention in London and New York are omitted from the figure.
The U.S. was willing to buy and sell gold at a fixed price but only for currencies convertible into gold at a fixed price. The ESF in principle would not sell gold in London for which it would be paid in inconvertible sterling. It did not sell gold to the EEA from April 1934, when the ESF was established until October 1936, when agreement was reached among the Tripartite principals for reciprocity with respect to sales of gold to each other (Brown 1944, p.158 The price of gold in London was basically determined by the dollar-sterling rate and the fixed buying price for gold with which the Treasury operated. The influence on the London price of gold was transmitted indirectly through the stable franc-dollar rate that gold standard arrangements were responsible for (Brown 1944, p.147) .
The EEA could not manage the sterling rate with operations in New York, but it could achieve its ends through operations in francs. To prevent appreciation of sterling, it would buy francs that it sold immediately for gold from the Banque de France. In the opposite case, if the EEA wanted to stem excessive sterling depreciation, it could sell gold to the Banque de France for francs to support sterling.
The Treasury was under no obligation to narrow the range of the fluctuations in the dollar-sterling exchange rate, an obligation it did have to support the parity of the dollar-franc exchange rate. Whenever the franc exchange rate rose to the gold export point, the Treasury would release gold to France or any other gold standard country under the same circumstances. Whenever the franc exchange rate fell to the gold import point, the Banque de France would release gold to the United States.
In practice, however, both the market and the Treasury treated the sterling rate just as they treated the franc rate. The franc exchange rate fluctuated between the 1 per cent spread between the fixed gold export point and the fixed gold import point. The dollar-sterling exchange rate fluctuated between a shifting high market value and a shifting low market value. Whenever sterling rose to a peak value, the market and the Treasury sold sterling. Gold would also move to London. Whenever sterling fell to low values, the Treasury bought sterling and gold in London. It was in the U.S. interest to keep sterling within its market boundaries.
An episode of intervention we document began on 15 January 1935, when the market was roiled by worry that the Supreme Court might rule that the abrogation of the gold clause was unconstitutional.
Since both the franc and sterling were weak, the ESF bought francs in Paris and also bought 14,300 ounces of gold in London at $34.60 per ounce, and an additional 30,100 ounces at $35.65 the next day.
For the next ten days, sterling moved between $4.875 and $4.882, but on 24 January the ESF resumed buying gold in London. On 26 January, when the sterling rate fell to $4.86, it bought sterling in New
York at $4.8510 and sold $5 million for sterling in London on 28 January, despite the fact that sterling was not convertible. The sterling purchases were accompanied by further gold purchases in London, $1.54 million during 15-21 January, $9.95 million the following week, and $1.683 million during 28 January-4 February.
During the three weeks that the ESF actively entered the exchange market, it spent $21 million for gold in London, sold $36 million for francs in Paris, and bought $14 million in sterling.
From 16 January to 18 February, the ESF support of sterling totaled $85.8 million (Brown 1942, p.65) . The Treasury's objective in buying gold in London was not to accumulate gold there but to offer arbitrageurs in that market (who would sell the gold that the ESF sought) a price per ounce that would match or exceed the amount they could collect by selling the gold to the U.S. Assay Office in New York, so there would be nothing to gain from shipping gold to New York. The gold would remain in London.
The Treasury's initial motive was to deter gold shipments to New York, but over time, the motive changed: its London gold purchases stabilized the dollar-sterling exchange rate.
The Tripartite Agreement
After protracted negotiations over a period of months conducted by Secretary Morgenthau (Sayers 1976, p.481) . According to Sayers (1976, p.488) , the EEA operated "to funnel dollars to continental buyers." By 1936-7 fluctuations in exchange rates had "retreated" in all ordinary weeks "almost to the range of the old gold points." The ESF was not a passive observer of a less volatile dollar-sterling exchange rate. It was actively engaged in maintaining that stability. September the ESF was authorized to sell £8000 sterling at the wartime rate of $4.03 5/8. On that day the Bank closed its Control Account 3 at the FRBNY.
The Banque de France, once sterling was allowed to depreciate, became a seller of francs in New
York at rates that declined to 2.31 cents on 6 September. On 8-9 September, the last of these transactions for the account of the Bank were sales of 31 million francs at 2.27 ¼ to 2.28 5/8 cents.
On 8 September the ESF bought francs for its own account for the first time in two years. It instructed the FRBNY to transfer them to the Banque de France to be converted into gold along with the small balance in its Control Account 3, and to place the gold under earmark. The ESF closed its Control Account B.
On 9 September the FRBNY did not receive its daily cable from the Banque de France fixing the French gold price. The Treasury was informed when it phoned Paris that the French government had set up a system of exchange controls.
Thus the Tripartite Agreement expired on the outbreak of World War II. Free exchange markets were replaced by measures of exchange controls. Convertibility of the dollar and other currencies ended.
12 In this paper we discuss ESF operations only in sterling and the franc to save on space. The ESF also engaged in considerable intervention in the belga, guilder and Swiss franc markets (the other participants in the Tripartite Agreement). These are described in Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz (2006a) chapter 2. 13 For details on this intervention see Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz (2006a) .
ESF Intervention, 1940-61.
The years 1934-39 were the zenith of ESF's intervention activities over the entire period 1934-61.
During the war the ESF held Swiss francs and balances in foreign currencies in depositories abroad. It made the Swiss francs "available for government and humanitarian purposes," according to the Treasury's statement (Treasury AR 1945, p.95) . Little official intervention occurred in the years after the war ended. Most foreign currencies were inconvertible. In addition, the U.S. stock of gold reserves was ample, the U.S. balance of payments was in surplus, and there was an excess demand for dollars in the world.
The U.S. Bretton Woods Agreement Act (PL. 171, 79 th Cong.) of 31 July 1945 made a great change with long-term effects on ESF operations. Before that date, the ESF may not have had access to the bulk of the funds that the Gold Reserve Act had set aside for it, but they were a prospective resource.
After that date, ESF resources were permanently limited. The conditions that prevailed when the war ended were markedly different from the 1950s on.
The economies of Western Europe had recovered, world trade had grown, and demand for U.S. goods and services, and dollars to pay for them became less pronounced. By 1958 the currencies of most of these countries achieved convertibility on current account.
By January 1961, when the Kennedy administration took office, the U.S. balance of payments as measured by outflows of gold and dollars to countries in surplus had substantially deteriorated, The loss of gold to foreigners in that month was seen as an expression of a lack of confidence in the administration's commitment to a dollar convertible into gold at a fixed price. The twin goals became to eliminate the balance-of-payments deficit and to check speculation against the dollar. The first goal was elusive. To achieve the second goal, the Treasury wanted to be in the same position as other countries that influenced the exchange rate of their currencies. That required resources to buy and sell other currencies or, in official parlance, sales and purchases of dollars.
To that end the ESF began to operate directly in the foreign exchange market. By In this environment the Treasury persuaded the Federal Reserve to serve as its partner in exchange market intervention. So began the second period of ESF intervention operations.
Objectives of ESF Intervention and Were They Successful?
The initial motive for intervention was to imitate the British invention of the EEA, believed by the Roosevelt administration to be depressing the exchange value of sterling at the expense of American foreign trade. By contrast, the attitude to currencies of gold standard countries was supportive, selling them gold and buying their currencies when weak, providing them with dollars when needed.
Neither before nor after the Tripartite Agreement was the fact of misalignment of currencies The Bretton Woods system failed for two reasons. Triffin (1960) described the first in his famous paradox: At $35 per ounce, the official gold price was too low to induce sufficient gold production (see Bordo 1993 , James 1996 . The United States, however, provided needed liquidity by running persistent balance-of-payments deficits. In the early 1960s, total external dollar liabilities began to exceed the U.S. Bordo (1993), and James (1996) . Pauls (1990) , Todd (1992) , and Hetzel (1996) discuss U.S. exchange-market policies during the Bretton Woods era. Beginning in September 1962, the Special Manager for foreign-exchange operations began issuing regular reports, which provide a running account of U.S. exchange-market developments and foreign-exchange operations (see Bulletin, various issues). 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Complicating these two fundamental problems of the Bretton Woods era were shortcomings associated with the adjustment of cross rates within the system. Great Britain, for example, ran persistent balance-of-payments deficits, implying an overvalued exchange rate, while Germany experienced the opposite. Cross-rate adjustment problems stemmed from economic developments within specific countries and not directly from the persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits. Nevertheless, these adjustment problems contributed to the dollar's difficulties in two ways: First, they created uncertainty about the entire Bretton Woods parity structure. If Britain, for example, devalued the pound, how might other countries, like France, the Netherlands, or Belgium respond, and what would the resulting series of events do to the entire system? Second, uncertainty about cross rates often induced speculative flows from deficit countries to surplus countries, which passed through dollars-the key vehicle currency-and added to the large, often unwanted dollar positions of surplus countries. As discussed below, such developments often compelled U.S. intervention.
$-Billions
When the shortcomings of the Bretton Woods system first started to appear in the late 1950s and early 1960s, U.S. policy makers did not seem to interpret them as evidence that the dollar was fundamentally overvalued in real terms. If they did, they were unwilling to make the appropriate policy adjustments. A nominal devaluation was out of the question, because it would threaten the reservecurrency status of the dollar. Similarly, throughout the entire period, U.S. policy makers generally were unwilling to risk growth and employment objectives for balance-of-payments purposes. They seemed to hope that surplus countries would bear the adjustment costs. Instead of a fundamental policy change, U.S. monetary authorities adopted a series of stop-gap initiatives, one of which was foreign-exchangemarket intervention.
The U.S. Treasury began intervening for the first time since World War II in March 1961, after
Germany and the Netherlands revalued their currencies. Even though the speculative surge that resulted from these revaluations did not directly target the dollar, the massive reshuffling of funds resulted in heavy concentrations of dollars in continental European central banks. U.S. authorities feared that these banks might convert them into gold. In its intervention operations, the Treasury generally bought dollars forward, thereby covering foreign-held spot positions.
Both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System viewed these intervention operations as successes. The Treasury had acted against short-term speculative movements of funds and had easilyand profitably-unwound the positions when speculative pressures abated. With the Treasury's encouragement and after a lengthy debate about the legal authority for such operations, the Federal Open Market Committee authorized interventions for the System's own account on February 13, 1962 (see Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2006b) 12, 1961 , December 5, 1961 , and January 23, 1962 , meetings. See also Hetzel (1996 . 18 The U.S. Treasury also used swaps during the Bretton Woods period, but their swap arrangements typically were ad hoc in nature or established to provide temporary loans to developing countries (see FOMC Task Force Paper #9, 1990) . 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Billions of Likewise the System and the Treasury occasionally undertook outright forward transactions during Bretton Woods. These had three attractive attributes: They conserved scarce foreign exchange.
They operated on forward premiums-barometers of market sentiment about the long-term viability of fixed spot rates. They offered cover for privately held dollar exposures, which otherwise might be offloaded to foreign central banks and converted into gold. Despite these advantages, forward operationsunlike swaps-could leave monetary authorities carrying exposures for undesirably long periods of time.
The Federal Reserve System, nevertheless, relied overwhelmingly on the swap mechanism during the Bretton Woods system. Swaps emphasized the temporary nature of the Federal Reserve's intervention operations while also signaling central-bank cooperation to the market. Participants generally negotiated the conditions for the swap lines-the overall limits on the amount and the duration of borrowings-on a twelve-month basis. Most lines were initially established with relatively small-$50 million-borrowing limits and three-month maturity dates. Typically, the arrangements allowed for only one rollover, and except for the Belgian swap line, participants were not to draw continuously on the lines. 20 Once the participating central banks negotiated these conditions, they became reciprocal, meaning that either party could initiate a drawing, and they operated on a standby basis, meaning that drawings were otherwise to be unconditional.
During the Bretton Woods era, central banks typically executed swaps on a flat basis; that is, both the spot and forward exchange rates were the same, as were any interest rates on investment vehicles associated with the drawings. In a typical swap transaction, the creditor central bank would invest its foreign-exchange proceeds in an interest-earning instrument for the duration of the swap. The country initiating the swap would usually finance an intervention with the proceeds, but might also have sought to invest any unused portion of the drawing temporarily. If, for some reason, similar-yielding investment vehicles were not available, deviations between the spot and forward exchange rates could compensate one of the parties. No party to a swap, however, was to earn a profit directly from the transaction.
While the swaps themselves were neutral with respect to returns, a profit or loss could result from the associated intervention, since under Bretton Woods, spot rates could still deviate within a 1% band around their central parity. (Intervention points were typically narrower.) The party initiating a drawing for intervention purposes was especially vulnerable should the creditor country revalue its currency. To avoid this risk, swap lines during the Bretton Woods era included "revaluation clauses." Accordingly, creditor countries agreed to sell to the country that initiated the swap a sufficient amount of its currency at the initial exchange rate to repay the swap without a loss. The clause was only used once, when the Netherlands Bank allowed the guilder to float in early May 1971 (FOMC, Task Force Paper #9, 1990 . Sometimes the creditor country instead gave the borrowing country a two-day notice of a revaluation, enabling the borrowing country to buy currency in the market. Revaluation clauses, however, provided no protection against a change in the entire exchange-rate system. The System incurred losses amounting to nearly $1 billion on swaps with the Belgian National Bank, the Bank of England, the Bundesbank, and the Swiss National Bank following the closing of the U.S. gold window and the subsequent floating of dollar exchange rates (FOMC, Task Force Paper #9, 1990, p. 5, and FOMC Task Force Paper #10, 1990, p. 25) . Treasury undertook outright forward sales of francs and sold franc-denominated securities to the SNB.)
The System then used the Swiss franc proceeds from these drawings to buy dollars from the SNB.
Although the SNB continued to hold the same amount of dollars as before the swap drawing, the forward leg of the swap now covered the bank's position. Transactions like this were very common during the Bretton Woods era up to the closing of the U.S. gold window on August 15, 1971.
Nevertheless, foreign central banks relied heavily on swap drawings during the Bretton Woods era to supplement reserves when their currencies were under downward pressure. Between 1962 and 1973 , the United States drew nearly $12.2 billion equivalent of foreign exchange from the swap lines, 21 Measuring profits and losses on foreign-exchange operations is very difficult because the results depend on how one treats opportunity costs. The FOMC Task Force Paper #10, 1990 (pp. 24-27) contains a lengthy discussion of whereas foreign central banks drew $13.0 billion (see figure 5) . 22 Typically, the pressure that prompted foreign central banks to draw on their swap lines did not stem from a lack of confidence in the dollar but from the aforementioned cross-rate-adjustment problems within the Bretton Woods system. Although many countries initiated such drawings, the United Kingdom accounted for two-thirds of all foreign swap drawings between 1962 and 1973 (see figure 6 ). In contrast, the swap lines with Mexico, Norway, and Sweden were never used during the Bretton Woods era. 
Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Relations
Although the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury often worked in tandem, a clear division of responsibility existed between these agencies during the Bretton Woods period. The Federal
Reserve focused on short-term operations, financed through swap drawings. Ideally, the System would soon reverse these transactions, so exchange-rate exposure and exchange loss generally were not big concerns. The U.S. Treasury engaged in similar short-term operations, but because of its clearer authority for intervention, the Treasury also undertook operations of a longer-term nature. Typifying this division of labor, the Treasury stood ready to "backstop" System swap operations when market conditions prevented the Federal Reserve from reversing a swap drawing.
During Bretton Woods, central banks typically did not buy (or sell) foreign currencies if they traded above (or below) their central parity, even if those currencies were well within their 1% trading bands. Our Swiss franc example illustrates the problem. Between July and early October 1962, pressures on the Swiss franc subsided and afforded the System opportunities to buy sufficient Swiss francs from the SNB to pay down much of its drawing on the BIS swap line, but not to repay any of its swap obligation with the SNB. Initially, the System rolled over its swap drawing with the SNB for an additional three months, hoping that pressures on the Swiss franc would abate. When this did not happen, the System undertook its first third-party swap. The System swapped British pounds for Swiss francs with the BIS and used the francs to repay the SNB. Third-party swaps became fairly common, but they only extinguished one swap obligation by extending another, and they skated close to a violation of the System's admonition against intervention of long duration. To terminate swap obligations when speculative pressures persisted, the System ultimately turned to the U.S. Treasury.
Under their informal agreement, if the Federal Reserve could not reverse a swap borrowing within the acceptable time, the U.S. Treasury would bail the Federal Reserve out of its swap obligation.
The Treasury could obtain the necessary foreign exchange either by selling longer-term, foreigncurrency-denominated securities to the Fed's counterparty, by drawing on its credit lines with the IMF, or in very extreme circumstances, by selling gold to the central bank that had extended the swap credit to the System. 23 The Treasury would then sell the foreign exchange that it obtained through these operations to the Federal Reserve, which could subsequently unwind its swap position. 23 The Treasury also might negotiate an increase in the dollar reserves that a foreign monetary authority might willingly hold (Board of Governors, Treasury Views, 1968) .
Were They Successful?
The FOMC authorized swaps as a means of offsetting temporary speculative movements of funds, which otherwise might drain U.S. gold reserves and undermine confidence in the Bretton Woods parity structure. In that regard, they often proved highly successful. They quickly provided temporary cover or financing for intervention; they signaled central bank cooperation and upped the costs of speculation, and they were largely self-financing once the speculative pressures reversed.
The swap lines also may have forestalled the drain on U.S. monetary gold, but they did not prevent it. The United States continued to lose gold at a rapid pace until the closing of the Gold Pool in early 1968 and again between late 1970 and the closing of the gold window in 1971. These gold losses persisted because swaps did not address the fundamental problems of Bretton Woods, Triffin's paradox, and U.S. inflation. U.S. policy makers, of course, never intended swaps to do so. In that regard, however, their temporary successes enabled policy makers to avoid appropriate policy adjustments.
Consequently, swaps may have actually prolonged and worsened the ultimate collapse of the system.
Conclusion
Exchange market intervention policies followed by the U.S. monetary authorities in recent decades were influenced by precedents from the past. Many of the tools of modern policy had been utilized by the Bank of England and other European central banks during the interwar period and even before World War I. However, most of the exchange rate policies followed before the 1930s would be classified as gold policies, implemented to influence the gold points. Direct exchange market intervention was less common. Policies followed by the U.S. Treasury before World War I can also be classified as gold policy. Direct purchases and sales of sterling and other foreign currencies in the 1920s were sporadic and of limited amount. Many of these techniques were adopted by the Exchange Stabilization Fund established in 1934 which in turn was patterned after the British Exchange Equalization Account.
The ESF actively engaged in gold policy and direct purchases and sales of sterling, francs and other currencies from 1934 to 1939. These policies were applied initially before 1936 to preserve the gold parity of the franc and to maintain the dollar value of sterling, which was not pegged to gold. From Many of the techniques and policies developed under the gold standard were used again in the subsequent regimes with very different results. In the interwar gold exchange standard and the postwar Bretton Woods era, credibility of commitment to convertibility was weakened by greater importance placed on domestic objectives. This meant that the classical adjustment was deliberately impeded.
Intervention operations were successful at the tactical level but did not prevent the gold exchange regime from collapsing under the shocks of the Great Depression -an event largely brought about by the major countries following incorrect and inconsistent policies and the basic misalignment of exchange rates, or the Bretton Woods system from collapsing owing to monetary policies inconsistent with the fundamentals of the regime.
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods the exchange rate regime has changed to a managed float.
Although the regime has changed, many of the techniques developed earlier have been adapted to the new environment.
